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ABSTRACT 
The U.S.-led effort to form transnational institutions and processes contributes to 
the decreasing relevance of the nation-state in relation to what has become know as 
globalization.  Globalization has modified the essential role of the nation-state towards 
managing global flows of resource, capital, and populations rather than, as in the past, 
presiding over distinct national economies.  The relationship between ICT and political 
stability is explored in order to determine the existence of a positive, negative, or non-
existent correlation in the Asia Pacific Region for 2007.  The importance of distinct ICT 
policy design is examined via case studies of Myanmar and Malaysia.  Building from 
these case studies a regional approach to state building is outlined as offering a way 
beyond the current impasse in the theory and practice of state building. The regional 
framework for emerging state assistance, which is proposed reinforces transnational 
process, makes substantive use of existing ICT, and builds upon ideas of locality to 
further security and development.  The Hourglass Model, which is the schematic basis for 
the regional approach, could facilitate state building by balancing global processes with 
local security and development concerns.  This approach enables the processes of 
capacity development and consensus building to take place at the transnational level, 
while reinforcing the shift of sovereignty upwards from the state to the regional 
framework and downwards to the local sub-national level.  The utility of ICT as an 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
I developed an interest in the relationship between Information Communication 
Technology (ICT), state building, and globalization during my participation in the U.S.-
led Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF).  A dominant theme in western Baghdad, where I was 
posted, was the desire for technological connectivity by the population.  Every structure 
from a single-family home to apartments with multi-family dwellings had satellite dishes.  
In addition to this, the vast majority of the Iraqi population that I encountered over the 
course of a yearlong deployment owned at least one cell phone, whose utility went far 
beyond its primary function as a means of communication.  During my time there, it was 
impossible not to notice the pace of technological diffusion and the desire on the part of 
the population for more access and further capacity.  A single-family dwelling, which 
might have none of the modern conveniences such as a refrigerator, oven, dishwasher, 
sink, automobile, still had a large functioning television set in an empty room with a dirt 
floor, around which the family huddled to ascertain their place in the global community.  
Over the course of discussions, Iraqis would almost always produce a cell phone to show 
photo albums, videos taken to document important family events, or play a new hit song 
or video.  In other cases, young adults would take you to their computers and demonstrate 
their participation in chat rooms with citizens from around the world from the comfort of 
their homes or Internet cafes.  This ICT diffusion was occurring right before my eyes in 
2005, under some of the harshest conditions imaginable.  All the while, the political 
stability of Iraq was under constant strain from the many challenges associated with the 
post-conflict setting and a variegated state-building effort.  Some of these challenges also 
relied on the diffusion of ICT capabilities, such as the use of cell phones to set-off 
improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and the use of the Internet to promote agendas 
unaligned with or against the state.  I began to wonder about the relationship between the 
diffusion of ICT and political stability, and whether this relationship was positive, 
negative, or irrelevant.  
In order to address this question, this thesis takes as its main premise that a 
rigorous plan to develop information communication technology (ICT) infrastructure is 
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crucial to the overall project of state building.  That is, ICT is crucial to promoting 
development and political stability in the context of the growing significance of 
globalization.  For the purpose of this thesis, political stability is defined as regime 
resilience against the possibility of unconstitutional or violent removal.1  Development, 
meanwhile, is the institutional and economic processes attending the transition to a 
market economy.2  ICT is a driving force in the case of ‘developing states’ in particular.  
Thus, when regulated properly, ICT can lead to prosperity and development and, when 
mismanaged, can facilitate instability and inequality.  
Connectivity promotes globalization, facilitating both communication and 
information sharing in revolutionary ways.  The potential of ICT is derived from the 
“ubiquitous wireless communication and computing capacity,” it can provide, which in 
turn enable “social units (individuals and organizations) to interact anywhere, anytime.”3  
ICT infrastructure connects governments with constituents and with other governments.4  
ICT infrastructure also generates consumers and connects them to global markets.5  In 
this context, the state should continue to play a role in the facilitation of greater ICT 
infrastructure and the promotion of globalization.  If this is the case then, nation-states 
with substantial ICT capacity should be more cooperative with each other, contribute 
more to global commerce, and arguably, more stable than those with limited ICT 
infrastructure. 
This thesis will explore the contemporary relationship between ICT, the state and 
globalization.  It will begin by discussing globalization and its relationship to political 
stability and ICT penetration, then move to a discussion of the role of ICT in state 
                                                 
1 Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay, and Massimo Mastruzzi, Governance Matters VI: Aggregate and 
Individual Governance Indicators 1996-2000 (Washington DC: The World Bank, 2007), 3. 
2 Michael Mousseau, “Market Civilization and Its Clash with Terror,” International Security, Vol. 27, 
No. 3 (2002/03): 27. 
3 Manuel Castells, “Informationalism, Networks, and the Network Society: a Theoretical Blueprint,” in 
Manuel Castells, ed., The Network Society: A Cross-cultural Perspective (Northampton, MA: Edward 
Elgar publishing Limited, 2004), 6. 
4 Sumit Roy, Globalization, ICT, and Developing Nations (California: Sage Publications Inc, 2005), 
13. 
5 Ibid., 13. 
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building.  Finally, the idea of a transnational-regional framework for state building will 
be explored.  It will be argued that the current challenges to state building (or nation 
building) can be mitigated through the utilization of ICT capacity and capability, and that 
in many instances a regional focus is more appropriate than a focus on an individual 
nation-state as such.  As already noted, the desire here is to determine if the relationship 
between the levels of ICT infrastructure used by a given ‘state’ and the stability of the 
given ‘state’ are positive, negative, or irrelevant.  Once this has been established, a brief 
exploration of the interdependence among ICT, state building, and globalization will be 
addressed in order to illuminate the combined relevance of these three elements as a 
prescription for successful development.  
The Asia Pacific will be relied upon heavily for historical precedents and 
examples due to the region’s diverse governance structures and the fact that the region is 
also a dominant contributor of ICT products utilized by the global ICT industry and 
boasts some of the most penetrated ICT utilizing states in the world.6  Another aspect of 
interest is the history of resistance to free access to information on the part of a number of 
governments in the region and the desire to exercise state control in order to prevent 
political dissenters from using ICT.7  Additionally, our understanding of best practices 
concerning governance and ICT policy is furthered via an examination of the developing 
states in the Asia Pacific region, particularly the two case studies of Myanmar and 
Malaysia.8  These two states were selected due to their shared characteristics of one-party 
dominance and the visible influence of ICT upon politics in Malaysia in comparison to 
the lack of significant political change resulting from the use of ICT in Myanmar.9 
                                                 
6 Nina Hachigian and Lily Wu, The Information Revolution in Asia (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 
2003), 6. 
7 Andrew L. Shapiro, The Control Revolution   (New York, NY: Publicaffairs, 1999), 65. 
8 Paul Smith, Terrorism and Violence in Southeast Asia (New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 2005), 3. 
9 Nina Hachigian and Lily Wu, The Information Revolution in Asia   (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 
2003), xx. 
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II. GLOBALIZATION AND THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
POLITICAL STABILITY AND ICT 
The contemporary world is profoundly shaped by the U.S.-led globalization 
project.  The term U.S.-led is used here due to the prominence of U.S. national power in 
facilitating globalization.10  The focus on globalization permeates popular and academic 
discourse on the subject of state building and ICT.  As a result, globalization has become 
an all-encompassing term for a variety of trans-national economic and social activity and 
the pursuit of modernity itself.  For example, the idea of technological globalization, 
which is particularly useful for the purposes of this study, focuses on the distribution 
between states of technological capabilities, collaboration to develop knowledge, and the 
creation of innovation.11  The common theme inherent to all aspects of globalization is a 
shift from the national to the transnational.  
This chapter will set out to define globalization in a manner that illuminates those 
attributes that influence political stability and ICT diffusion.  Following this, the chapter 
will focus exclusively on the relationship between globalization and the nation-state 
since, for better or worse, this is where it all begins and ends.  Next, in light of this 
relationship, the importance of locality will be established in order to reinforce the notion 
of policy relevance as crucial to success or failure.  Finally, the chapter will show how 
globalization affects political stability and the role ICT plays in the process of state 
management of political stability.  
Globalization is framed by two distinct enablers summed up nicely by Jagdish 
Bhagwati, in In Defense of Globalization, where he writes, “the story of globalization 
today must be written in two inks: one colored by technical change and the other by state 
action.”12  To put it another way, the nation-state (or the state) has played a key role in 
                                                 
10 Christopher J. Coyne, After War: The Political Economy of Exporting Democracy  (Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 2008), 185. Also see Mark T. Berger, The Battle for Asia: From Decolonization 
to Globalization, London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004. 
11 Michael Kitson and Jonathan Michie, “The Political Economy of Globalization,” in Daniele 
Archibugi, Jeremy Howells, and Jonathan Michie, eds., Innovation Policy in a Global Economy  (New 
York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 172. 
12 Jagdish Bhagwati, In Defense of Globalization (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2004), 11. 
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re-orienting its own operations away from the national towards the regional and the 
global.  Transnational economic, political, and cultural processes have yet to completely 
transcend the nation-state framework, but they clearly foreshadow the importance of the 
regional and the global in their overall design and purpose.13  This thesis defines 
globalization as the effort, implicit or explicit, to form global institutions and processes, 
which are still partly carried out at the national level, but to a large extent point towards 
some sort of global form of interaction.14  More specifically, globalization exists as a 
facilitating factor for the “international community” aspect of the double compact 
highlighted in Ashraf Ghani and Clare Lockhart’s Fixing Failed States.  This double 
compact, which, in their view now underpins the state’s claim to sovereignty, consists of 
a compact between the state and its citizens, and a second compact between the state and 
the international community.15  This interaction with the international community is a 
necessary requirement for prosperity.  As the notion of a double compact makes clear, 
globalization has had a profound effect on the idea and practice of the modern nation-
state over the past thirty years or so. 
A. GLOBALIZATION AND THE NATION-STATE 
One major shortcoming or benefit, depending on your point of view, is the effect 
globalization has had on the framework of international governance established in the 
post-1945 era.  This internationally recognized structural design for governance was 
legitimized through the United Nations and rested on the universalization of the 
sovereign nation-state as the key unit of the overall global order.  Much of the debate 
about globalization is centered on the decreasing relevance of the nation-state.  This 
perception is derived from the “reduction of the regulating capacity of the nation-state 
with regard to its classical functions in the field of economic and social policies, raising 
                                                 
13 Saskia Sassen, A Sociology of Globalization (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 2007), 3. 
14 Ibid.,  5. 
15 Ashraf Ghani and Clare Lockhart, Fixing Failed States: A Framework for Rebuilding a Fractured 
World (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2008), 8. 
 7
the issue of governability and political legitimacy.”16  The decreasing levels of national 
regulating capacity have occurred hand in hand with the increasing importance of the 
transnational corporations.17  For example, a recent edition of The Economist noted the 
increasing importance of the way in which multinational corporations have established 
“long-term problem-solving relationships with governments in which the firms help to 
design an infrastructure programme as well as build some or all of it.”18  In the 21st 
century, states are relying less on state-to-state interaction to promote growth and more 
on the transnational private sector to achieve their ostensibly national aims.  
This question of relevance is tied to the authority or influence of state 
governments in the development of enablers that facilitate connectivity.  The emerging 
number of multi-national corporations and regional accommodations stifle state 
sovereignty and circumvent the influence of the nation-state.  The tension between the 
processes of globalization and the nation-state is closely linked to these multinational 
corporations and their pursuit for optimal business arrangements based on freedom from 
the counterproductive policies of the nation-state.19  In the light of this, the contemporary 
nation-state may not necessarily become completely irrelevant, but we are certainly 
witnessing the shifting of sovereignty upward to transnational authorities and downwards 
to the sub-national level.20   
Bruce Porter has suggested that this shifting of power upward to the regional and 
global level has already taken place, but cautions that the shift is still subject to the power 
of the state as “the United Nations and the European Community can spearhead  
 
                                                 
16 Harald Barrios, Martin Beck, Andreas Boeckh, and Klaus Segbers (eds.), Resistance to 
Globalization: Political Struggle and Cultural Resistance in the Middle East, Russia, and Latin America  
(Rutgers University, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2003), 2. 
17 Ibid., 2. 
18 The Economist, “The Empire Strikes Back,” A Special Report on Globalization, Vol. 388, Number 
8598, September 20– 26, 2008, 13. 
19 Jan Narveson, “The Obsolescence of the State: New Support for Old Doubts,” in Yeager Hudson, 
ed., Globalism and the Obsolescence of the State (Lewiston, NY: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1999), 17-18. 
20 The sliding/slippage of sovereignty upwards and downwards is a theme highlighted by Mark T. 
Berger. 
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cooperative endeavors, but only if their constituent self-organized states freely 
subordinate themselves to their authority and implement those endeavors on the state 
level.”21 
Globalization has not replaced the nation-state, but it has profoundly modified the 
role of the nation-state within a networked global community.22  As such, “transnational 
links may be increasing but governments are still able to assert control over the access to 
technology, should they decide it is in their interest.”23  The nation-state still has 
considerable power in many places, but it has also lost a lot of economic sovereignty in 
relation to globalization even if states can still control the use and distribution of ICT 
capacity.  This work then, assumes the continued, yet decreasing, relevance of the nation-
state in the context of contemporary globalization.  The transformation of the nation-state 
is a result of the movement of sovereignty upwards away from the nation-state to 
supranational institutions and regional or global accommodations.24  This slide of 
sovereignty upwards requires that the nation-state reorient itself towards managing global 
flows of capital and information rather than, as in the past, presiding over a national 
economy.25 
B. THE MERITS AND SHORTFALLS OF STANDARDIZATION 
A major element in the power of globalization lies in its promotion of 
standardized processes and mechanisms to achieve higher levels of efficiency and greater 
                                                 
21 Bruce D. Porter, War and the Rise of the State: The Military Foundations of Modern Politics (New 
York, NY: The Free Press, 1994), 302. 
22 Manuel Castells, Information Technology, Globalization, and Social Development, UNRISD 
Discussion Paper No. 114 (Geneva, Switzerland: United Nations Research Institute for Social 
Development, Sep 1999), 5, 
http://www.unrisd.org/80256B3C005BCCF9/(httpAuxPages)/F270E0C066F3DE7780256B67005B728C/$
file/dp114.pdf (accessed on September 16, 2008). 
23 Cherie Steele and Arthur Stein, “Communications Revolutions and International Relations,” in 
Juliann Emmons Allison, ed., Technology, Development, and Democracy: International Conflict in the 
Information Age (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2002), 42. 
24 Manuel Castells, Information Technology, Globalization, and Social Development, UNRISD 
Discussion Paper No. 114 (Geneva, Switzerland: United Nations Research Institute for Social 
Development, Sep 1999), 5, 
http://www.unrisd.org/80256B3C005BCCF9/(httpAuxPages)/F270E0C066F3DE7780256B67005B728C/$
file/dp114.pdf (accessed on September 16, 2008). 
25 Ibid., 5. 
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productivity across space and time.  Thomas Friedman emphasizes the role of 
technology, more specifically ICT, in his work concerned with the “flattening of the 
world.”  Friedman speaks specifically, not only of the diffusion of standardized enablers 
such as the Internet and various transnational forms of infrastructure involved in the 
transmission of information, ideas and services, but of the resulting spread of 
standardized business practices associated with this “new global platform for 
collaboration.”26  The vision of a borderless world with standardized regulatory practices, 
such as universal rules for travel and the operation of the global economy in general are 
central to globalization.  The resulting structural advantages from standardization are 
seen to be the imposition of an internationally recognized design upon the many 
fragmented practices of local governments.  
The process of standardization though, has yet to demonstrate the ability to 
account for the complex demographics that shape the global landscape.  The unique 
interests within the demography of the world must be addressed pursuant to the current 
challenges facing globalization.  Contemporary globalization, more specifically, the 
processes of standardization are currently challenged by the “local, sub-national, national, 
and regional patterns of politics and development.”27  The perception exists that in this 
system, “wealth and power become increasingly concentrated in the hands of a few, 
while the majorities, who are growing daily, are excluded not only from the benefits but 
also from the actual economic system itself.”28  This perception fails to distinguish 
between globalization in broad terms and state specific policies dictating the diffusion of 
globalization upon their societies.  The importance of localized policy serves to facilitate 
or impede development within the current global system, and blame for the disparity 
should be directed at the policies and their state promoters versus globalization at large.  
                                                 
26 Thomas L. Friedman, The World is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-first Century, Updated and 
Expanded (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2006), 91. 
27 Harald Barrios, Martin Beck, Andreas Boeckh, and Klaus Segbers (eds.), Resistance to 
Globalization: Political Struggle and Cultural Resistance in the Middle East, Russia, and Latin America 
(Rutgers University, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2003), 4. 
28 Luiz Demetrio Valentini, “An Economy that Avoids Exclusion,” in Robert Papini, Antonio Pavan, 
and Stefano Zamagni, eds., Living in the Global Society  (Brookfield, VT: Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 1997), 
180-181. 
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Pankaj Ghemawat refers to this paradox of contemporary globalization as “semi-
globalization,” that is, the importance of balancing the differences between local cross-
border strategy, international standardization and economies of scale.29  The relevance of 
policy by local governance diminishes the standardizing character of globalization. 
The strength of local policy though should be scrutinized carefully.  State or local 
policy-makers cannot survive on their own under the auspice of globalization, let alone a 
globalized economy.  Ranveig Gissinger and Nils Peter Gleditsch conclude in their article 
titled Globalization and Conflict that nation-states are increasingly powerless in the 
contemporary globalized world economy.30  The continued ability of the nation-state to 
make choices in which components of globalization may be absorbed or rejected 
diminishes with each passing day as the process of globalization facilitates international 
connectivity for the pursuit of growth.  
C. UNEVEN CONTRIBUTIONS AND THE EFFECT UPON POLITICAL 
STABILITY 
Trends in globalization have an enormous impact upon the state governing bodies, 
regional accommodations, global organizations, and multi-national affiliations through 
the ability to generate growth and/or contribute to reinforcing poverty.  “As the world 
converges, it simultaneously highlights the growing alienation and inequality between 
regions and cultures.”31  Globalization may pressure the state in a manner inconsistent 
with the pressures upon the global community at large.  This is due to the level of 
perceived gain from local and global stakeholders compounded by the divergence of 
interests unique to state governance.  At the state level, governments must respond to the 
needs of their constituents.  As Susan Strange argues in Cave!  Hic Dragones: A Critique 
of Regime Analysis, “even the most authoritarian governments cannot in the long run 
                                                 
29 Pankaj Ghemawat, Redefining Global Strategy (Massachusetts: Harvard Business School Press, 
2007), 9-11. 
30 Ranveig Gissinger and Nils Peter Gleditsch, “Globalization and Conflict: Welfare, Distribution, and 
Political Unrest,” Journal of World-Systems Research, Vol. V, 2 (1999): 354, 
http://jwsr.ucr.edu/archive/vol5/number2/html/gissinger/gissinger/ (accessed January 18, 2008).  
31 Sai Felicia Krishna-Hensel, “Challenges of a Transnational World: Imperatives for Cooperation,” in 
Sai Felicia Krishna-Hensel, ed., Global Cooperation: Challenges and Opportunities in the Twenty-First 
Century (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2006), 3. 
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remain indifferent to deep discontents or divisions of opinions in the societies they 
rule.”32  In this regard, globalization is viewed as either a success or failure, depending 
on the level of expectations and the existing and/or changes to the socio-economic status 
of the people concerned.  
Much of the uneven impact of globalization on political stability can thus be 
attributed to the economic characteristics of globalization and the resultant challenge of 
diffusing wealth among the population of a state on terms that ameliorate rather than 
aggravate social and economic differences.  Foreign trade and foreign direct investment 
are both aspects of globalization that have been demonstrated to facilitate both conflict 
and stability.  “FDI boosts inequality and political instability, while trade creates 
favorable conditions for peace.”33  In addition, “trade liberalization creates ‘winners’ and 
‘losers’, sometimes generating unemployment in selected industries and producing more 
inequality.”34  These characteristics of a globalized economy have reinforced the 
accumulation of wealth among elites and non-state entities, while driving down the 
income and quality of life of the poor in many societies.  The perception of the state’s 
inability to produce prosperity for the masses through increased productivity and cutting 
back on welfare programs has contributed to the discontent with globalization.  Donald 
Snodgrass lends weight to the challenges facing political stability from the poor and their 
role in governance stating the “poor are not just a statistical abstraction, but a large, 
distinct, independently identifiable social group which has its own history and plays a 
particular role in the political and economic life of a nation.”35  
                                                 
32 Susan Strange, “Cave! Hic Dragones: A Critique of Regime Analysis,” in Paul F. Diehl, ed., The 
Politics of Global Governance: International Organizations in an Interdependent World (Boulder, CO: 
Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1997), 52. 
33 Ranveig Gissinger and Nils Peter Gleditsch, “Globalization and Conflict: Welfare, Distribution, and 
Political Unrest,” Journal of World-Systems Research, Vol. V, 2  (1999): 329, 
http://jwsr.ucr.edu/archive/vol5/number2/html/gissinger/gissinger/ (accessed January 18, 2008).  
34 G. Shabbir Cheema, “Inclusive Governance and Democracy in Asia: Transitions and Challenges,” 
in Dennis A. Rondinelli and John M. Heffron, eds., Globalization and Change in Asia (Boulder, CO: 
Lynne Rienner Piblishers Inc., 2007), 153. 
35 Donald R. Sondgrass, Inequality and Economic Development in Malaysia (New York, NY: Oxford 
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The perception of socio-economic inequality or injustice brought about by the 
inability to diffuse wealth generates social discontent, which may gain traction in the 
form of political opposition.  The members of this political opposition will demand 
inclusion, reform, and if still unsatisfied a change in governance.  Amy Chua expands on 
this notion of localized discontent and its importance in the contemporary context in 
World on Fire.  She emphasizes the ability of the socially deprived to mobilize along 
socio-economic lines compounded by ethnicity to transcend national boundaries 
facilitated by globalization and further aggravated by the level of perceived injustice or 
exclusion.36  As this social discontent works to destabilize the political structure 
internally then, it also has the ability to apply external pressures upon the government by 
projecting instability outwards in a manner inconsistent with regional stability. 
D. THE ROLE OF ICT IN MANAGING POLITICAL STABILITY 
Political stability is widely recognized to be a continuous process of governance 
with varying levels of stability or instability dependent on a multitude of internal factors 
and external pressures.  A significant effort was undertaken to determine the key 
indicators in modeling political stability by an organization of scholars aptly named The 
Political Instability Task Force (PITF).37  The PITF was “originally formed in 1994 at 
the request of senior policymakers in the U.S. government…to assess and explain the 
vulnerability of states around the world to political instability and state failure.”38  The 
conclusive model produced by the PITF for determining conditions for political 
instability was derived from reliance upon the following four indicators: regime type, 
infant mortality, regional stability, and the level of state-led discrimination.39  A review 
then, of pertinent literature suggests globalization broadly, and ICT specifically serves as 
a facilitating factor for each of the preceding indicator categories.  This relationship 
                                                 
36 Amy Chua, World on Fire: How Exporting Free Market Democracy Breeds Ethnic Hatred and 
Global Instability (New York, NY: Random House, Inc., 2003), 72. 
37  Formerly known as the State Failure Task Force (SFTF). 
38  Political Instability Task Force, http://globalpolicy.gmu.edu/pitf/index.htm  (accessed on 
November 4, 2008). 
39 Jack A. Goldstone, et al, A Global Forecasting Model of Political Instability (Washington DC: 
American Political Science Association, 2005), http://globalpolicy.gmu.edu/pitf/pitfp5.htm (accessed on 
September 18, 2008). 
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serves to reinforce the perception of ICT as crucial to the process of political stability for 
the governing entities of the contemporary world.  
ICT is just one enabler that may serve to further stabilize governance or 
compound a government’s susceptibility to political instability.  “The impact of ICT in a 
country or a region depends on its nature, the purpose of its deployment and its spatial 
spread, besides the economic, administrative and social environment backing up the 
strategy of its diffusion.”40  The outcome then becomes determined by the adopted ICT 
policies of the government in each particular case and subsequent balancing of ICT 
policy versus constituent desire for access.  The PITF suggests that a full autocracy 
regime tends to be the most stable, and ICT may be utilized to further the monopoly of 
the regime on governance such as discussed later in the case of Myanmar.41  ICT 
stimulates development by allowing countries to skip stages of economic growth through 
technological advanced modernity, while the negative effect on economies unable to 
adjust to these new technologies is expressed cumulatively.42  
The relationship between ICT and political stability is derived from the processes 
inherent in the technologies facilitating the connectivity between a government and its 
constituents.  “Politics and governance rely on the communication of messages and ideas, 
and technology can bolster political power by influencing the speed, destination, and 
anonymity of those communications.”43  In addition to these processes of connectivity, 
ICT facilitates state processes of governance unique to each regime, underlying the 
                                                 
40 Amitabh Kundu, ICT and Human Development: Towards Building a Composite Index for Asia 
(New Delhi, India: Elsevier, 2004), 1. 
41 Full autocracy is a regime that combines an absence of effective contestation with repressed or 
suppressed participation. A full democracy is also considered to be just as stable with partial autocracies 
and partial democracies substantially more vulnerable to crisis than their more “coherent” counterparts. 
Jack A. Goldstone, et al, A Global Forecasting Model of Political Instability (Washington DC: American 
Political Science Association, 2005), http://globalpolicy.gmu.edu/pitf/pitfp5.htm (accessed on September 
18, 2008). 
42 Manuel Castells, Information Technology, Globalization, and Social Development, UNRISD 
Discussion Paper No. 114 (Geneva, Switzerland: United Nations Research Institute for Social 
Development, Sep 1999), 3, 
http://www.unrisd.org/80256B3C005BCCF9/(httpAuxPages)/F270E0C066F3DE7780256B67005B728C/$
file/dp114.pdf (accessed on September 16, 2008). 
43 Nina Hachigian and Lily Wu, The Information Revolution in Asia (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 
2003), 56. 
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importance of ICT policy management.  “Technologies are political, then, in the sense 
that they have proclivities that can easily be tapped by certain policies and practices.”44  
The embedded character of ICT in the processes of governance, compounded by the 
capacity for ICT access by citizens, can serve to strengthen the compact between the 
government and the governed.  This level of proportionality, between access to 
information and how the state manages it, has profound implications on political stability.  
Short-term experiences in crisis, whether they are economic, man-made, or natural, can 
take on significant dimensions in the face of weak governance and high levels of 
constituent access.  On the other hand, the same conditions may lend credence to a sense 
of political inclusion by the population and strengthen governance dependent on the state 
management of ICT policy.  
In order to demonstrate the geospatial relationship between ICT and political 
stability a simple visual aid follows.  This chart will show a positive relationship between 
ICT penetration and political stability.  Internet penetration is used to represent ICT 
penetration because it represents “the extent to which a country’s population are 
proactively accessing, exchanging, and providing information on a global basis.”45  The 
rate of ICT growth and the related pace of local, regional and global connectivity also 
serves as an indicator based on societal shifts from exclusivity to information access and 
presents the depth of challenge for governance to properly manage ICT diffusion.  “Some 
degree of flux in the underlying politics of a state must be present before ICT can have an 
effect on changing politics.”46  Finally, political stability is represented by the 
corresponding levels of state stability as indicated by the Failed States Index.
                                                 
44 Andrew L. Shapiro, The Control Revolution (New York, NY: Publicaffairs, 1999), 14. 
45 Nina Hachigian and Lily Wu, The Information Revolution in Asia (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 
2003), 2. 
46 Ibid., 71. 
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Figure 1.   State stability for Asia Pacific Region 
 
Figure 1 represents the corresponding levels of political stability derived from the 
Fund for Peace Failed State Index (FSI).47  The FSI measures a series of 
social/political/economic indicators in order to determine the level of state stability.  The 
FSI is useful as a starting point to determine correlation between state stability and both 
Internet penetration and Internet growth in the Asia Pacific Region.  The darker the shade 
of color in Figure 1 corresponds to decreasing rank of state stability in relation to other 
states in the Asia Pacific region.  
Data for the Internet is used in this particular case, but the same method could be 
used for cellular phones, landline phones and televisions.  The Internet data serves utility 
                                                 
47  The Fund for Peace, Failed States Index Scores 2008, 
http://www.fundforpeace.org/web/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=292&Itemid=452 
(accessed on November 13, 2008). 
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due to the linkages between Internet access and infrastructure to connectivity in the local, 
regional, and global sense for more than just communication, but access to and the 
sharing of knowledge.  Internet penetration is a continuing process usually measured as 
an increase over time, whereas state stability is a process subject to more frequent 
change, positive or negative, depending upon many variables.  
 
Figure 2.   State stability and Internet penetration48 
 
Figure 2 portrays a positive correlation between state stability and Internet 
penetration for the year 2008.  The higher degree of internet penetration corresponds with 
a higher level of stability based upon the applied data sets.  This correlation appears to 
have no relationship to the type of political system in any particular state, but is much 
more closely aligned with the type of development policies practiced by each regime type 
                                                 
48  The Fund for Peace, Failed States Index Scores 2008, 
http://www.fundforpeace.org/web/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=292&Itemid=452 
(accessed on November 13, 2008) and Internet World Stats, Asia Internet Usage and Population  
(Miniwatts marketing Group, 2008), http://www.Internetworldstats.com/stats3.htm#asia (accessed 
November 13, 2008). 
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as illustrated by the case studies of Myanmar and Malaysia.  If unique policy 
management is vital to the political stability of a state, then it becomes necessary to 
produce a snapshot of correlated data in order to begin the process of drilling down into 
specific states for greater understanding of the relationship between the two.  Also, while 
Internet penetration is utilized to portray a relationship with state stability, the rate of 
growth in Internet penetration is useful in determining what impact if any the pace of 
diffusion has upon each state. 
E. CONCLUSION 
Globalization has become the principle focus for numerous studies in economics, 
political science, and the social sciences generally.  This chapter explored some of the 
major ideas associated with globalization and its relationship to the nation-state in order 
to define and frame the contemporary relationship between ICT diffusion and state 
building.  It is not globalization alone that contributes to uneven development, as many 
critics of globalization tend to argue.  A major cause of the uneven distribution of the 
benefits of globalization lies in the form of governance, more specifically the acceptance 
or rejection of a policy centered on the premise “that trade enhances growth, and that 
growth reduces poverty.”49  The correlation between ICT and political stability, both 
conceptually and empirically, has been demonstrated to be positive — or at least can be 
positive under most circumstances depending on the state concerned.  Acknowledging 
ICT is not the sole contributor to political instability, nor is it an independent actor free of 
state management, provides us with a basis for further exploration.  The following 
chapters will look at state building in theory and practice and then turn to specific case 
studies in an attempt to capture the dynamics involved between ICT and political 
stability.  The overall goal is to determine what sort of policy design for ICT is most 
effective for state building. 
                                                 
49 Jagdish Bhagwati, In Defense of Globalization (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2004), 53. 
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III. CONTEMPORARY STATE BUILDING AND THE NEED TO 
MOVE BEYOND CRISIS RESPONSE 
The contemporary global order is awash with various projects concerned with the 
practice of state building.  The burgeoning literature on state building routinely 
emphasizes the feasibility of various efforts if the right guidelines are followed.  
However, it is, as many authors and policy-makers acknowledge, much more challenging 
in practice.  The challenge is derived from the extensive international processes required 
for state building and the amount of resources required generating self-sustaining 
governance.  Add to this the lack of institutional memory, an absence of meaningful long-
term commitment on the part the international community, not to mention important local 
issues to do with history, demography and geography and it becomes clear that any single 
state-building project is actually a tremendous endeavor in terms of time and commitment 
by all concerned.  In practice the investment and momentum for any state-building 
project ebbs and flows.  The problem posed to state building is significant based on these 
challenges and yet, as history has demonstrated, not entirely insurmountable.  Each state-
building project is unique in both the initial conditions met at the start and the subsequent 
design imposed for continuity.  
This chapter begins by discussing the necessity of state building in order to 
augment the globalization project and the expansion of governance, security, and market 
participation.  Robert Kagan’s observations in The Return of History and the End of 
Dreams, offers an account of contemporary geo-political conditions, which is acutely 
concerned with the growing demand for modernization and globalization nations and 
their citizens around the world.50  It is this geo-political and global economic context 
within which state building is explored.  Contemporary state building is presented as a 
process that is inherently “corrupt” due to the continued practice of generating state-
building policy as a response to a crisis.  State building as crisis response ensures that a 
particular project is hastily implemented under the auspices of a short time horizon and 
                                                 
50 Robert Kagan, The Return of History and the End of Dreams (New York, NY: Random House, Inc., 
2008), 81. 
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the desire to immediately demonstrate improvement and/or development.  Finally, the 
security implications which arise from crisis response methodologies will be explored to 
outline the risks associated with hastily implemented exclusionary policies. 
For the purposes of this chapter, the state will be given a functional as well as a 
conceptual definition derived from the contemporary literature.  The state is defined 
functionally as “the legislature, the police, the judiciary, and the various branches of civil 
and military administration.”51  Additionally, the state is defined conceptually as an 
instrument of the convergence of common purpose with public law.52  The crucial 
importance of state building assumes the necessity of the state.  The discussion that 
follows will also draw upon the security aspects of realism, the social implications of an 
unregulated and open economy derived from liberalism, and a focus on the relationship 
between the state and class used by proponents of a structural analysis of the ‘state’.53 
A. THE NECESSITY FOR STATE BUILDING 
Contemporary state building is necessary in order to augment, or in some cases 
introduce, the internationally accepted structural design for local, regional, and global 
governance.  There is an underlying reliance upon many to separate the functions of state 
building and nation building along the following lines,  
State building involves the creation of concrete, identifiable administrative 
and political institutions.  Nation building is the process by which a 
population develops a sense of community or connection that becomes the 
basis of individual and group political identity, which in turn influences 
individual and group political behavior.54  
State building cannot occur within the context of such a divide, but must demonstrate the 
convergence of these two preceding ideals into one policy design in order to generate a 
self-sustaining state.  
                                                 
51 Ashraf Ghani and Clare Lockhart, Fixing Failed States: A Framework for Rebuilding a Fractured 
World (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2008), 117. 
52 Ibid., 121. 
53 Sumit Roy, Globalization, ICT, and Developing Nations: Challenges in the Information Age 
(Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications Inc., 2005), 28-29. 
54 Mary P. Callahan, Making Enemies: War and State Building in Burma (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
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The contemporary state is a relatively new phenomenon having emerged in 
Europe between the 1450s and the 1650s.55  As a planned process that involved external 
intervention; however, we need look back no further than the twentieth century, to cases 
such as the British experience in Iraq during the 1920s-1930s.  The result of this pre-
United Nation state-building project is best described by Toby Dodge who writes: “by the 
time of its independence in 1932, Iraq could neither defend itself against neighboring 
states, nor impose order unassisted across its territory, and it depended on the RAF as the 
final guarantor of its survival.”56  The relevant history concerning state building is 
covered by the numerous and well documented cases of post-war reconstruction and 
decolonization during the latter half of the twentieth century.57 
The beginning of contemporary state building coincides with the creation of the 
United Nations (UN).  The UN was created in 1945 with only 50 existing states meeting 
the terms of membership in order to sign the charter.  The rest of the world in 1945 
consisted of conquered enemies, neutral countries, countries immersed in civil war, and 
an array of European colonial possessions.58  It is from this complex global order that the 
system of sovereign nation-states would be universalized and state building as a formal 
project would emerge.  Unlike earlier decades, however, the design of state-building 
projects must now accommodate the requirements of globalization.  Even the most 
isolated state must have the ability to plug into regional or global markets, and allow for 
advances in technology for both transportation and ICT in order to take advantage of 
assisted development.  Challenges appear in the form of creating institutions which ‘fit’ 
international design for commerce and diplomacy while addressing the fragility of local 
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conditions.  State building then, is arguably more challenging today due to the 
corresponding occurrence of the U.S. led globalization project.  
The sustained existence of international organizations such as the United Nations 
and regional accommodations such as the European Union (EU) are inherently designed 
to promote the nation-state project, even under the auspice of increasing irrelevance due 
to the encroaching standardization of globalization and modernity.  This organizational 
design generates the advancement of geopolitical concerns, global political economy, and 
the universal pursuit of humanitarian projects.  The ability to plug into this global 
community and actively participate requires a standardized system of organizations 
readily available to not only receive the benefits of membership, but also demonstrate the 
capacity to contribute to other members.  The state then is designed to contribute to 
mainly two processes of global arrangement.  First, the state must demonstrate efficiency 
to an international framework meant to facilitate common interests.  Second, the state 
must acquiesce to the establishment and enforcement of international law.  These two 
pillars of global design maintain their defining qualities in global forums such as the 
United Nations on down to the level of individual state governance.  
B. STATE BUILDING TO GENERATE INTERNATIONAL AND 
DOMESTIC FIT 
State building is vital in the pursuit of expanding the global political economy and 
reinforcing the relevance of regional and global accommodations in order to generate an 
international fit both socially and economically, while also building the ever heeded 
demand for capacity.  A state must demonstrate the capacity for governance consisting of 
“authority, concerted action, and the resultant institutions.”59  Contemporary state 
building is pursued by external powers with a foothold alliance among the indigenous 
population each complementing the other in the generation of legitimacy and self 
sustainability of the state.60  During the course of such an endeavor, state building may 
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manifest itself as “formal military occupation, counter-insurgency, peacekeeping, 
national reconstruction, foreign aid and the use of stabilization forces.”61  These state-
building characteristics appear threaded throughout the necessary institutions required to 
contribute to the processes of meeting expectations both internal to the state, as well as 
the expectations of external stakeholders in the international community.  This is 
reflected best by Ghani and Lockhart in their description of the double compact at the 
core of their citizen-based approach strategy for state building.62  The double compact 
underlying the state’s claim to sovereignty consists of a compact between the state and its 
citizens, and a second compact between a state and the international community.63  This 
ideal of a compact between the state and international community suggests regionalism at 
a minimum, and hinges on the successful management of those institutional relationships 
required for self-sustaining development and the political maturity of new governance.  
The state-building project requirement for fit with the international community 
suggests a strong correlation for liberalizing both economically and politically in order to 
compete in a global economy.64  The state must perform to meet these expectations or 
succumb to intra-state regime change as a result of social accountability and/or exclusion 
from both regional and global accommodations.  This track of development results in 
policy pressure to incorporate capitalism, unstrung from political concessions, with the 
quiet hope that cultural liberalization or exerting soft power may produce beneficial 
change for all.65  This approach allows for the state, regardless of political structure, to 
participate in a global economy and open domestic markets to regional and global trade 
relationships. 
The design for the creation of institutional capacity varies, but the focus on best 
practices to create or further develop these institutional capabilities remains the same.  
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The same determination has been made repeatedly for judicial, educational, and 
economic, as the characteristics of governance and their relationship to the internal 
populace has changed little since the end of World War II.  A singular focus to rapidly 
generate institutional capacity lacks the ability to unite the populace or promote the 
identity of the political structure.  This results in prolonged debate by all stakeholders 
over the matters of access, placement, and cost of institutional capacity-generating 
projects.  The competitiveness introduced by external stakeholders, due to the monopoly 
of monies they possess, does more harm than good for the state-building project.  One 
such example from the Afghanistan experience is the road from Kabul to Khandahar, 
which was completed on time, but at the cost of one million dollars (USD) a mile borne 
by the United States by the time the project was completed in 2003.66  In the end, this 
road became far more of a symbol for the challenges facing state building than a 
successful example of comprehensive long-term and planned capacity building.  
C. THE DYNAMICS OF STATE BUILDING AS A RESPONSE TO CRISIS 
Arguably, the most significant challenge confronting state building is the harsh 
reality that almost all state-building projects are initiated only as a result of some form of 
crisis requiring intervention.  The fact, or the appearance, that the United States acts 
substantively only in response to a crisis as a prelude to state building results in a parallel 
conceptual crisis response approach on the part of practitioners and policy-makers 
associated with state building.  Crisis, as it is defined here, relies upon Carnes Lord 
Interpretation as “a defining moment – a point in a developing series of events where 
significant change becomes possible,”67 yet constrained by, “an awareness of finite 
time,” and compounded by the, “heightened probability of involvement in military 
hostilities.”68  The appearance of crisis generates surprise and is usually met with rapid, 
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but not thoroughly vetted practices in order to promote the perception of global 
involvement for grandiose causes and lobbied participation towards social advancement.  
This is exacerbated by the, “failure to assess systemically the processes, styles and 
psychology of crisis decision making,” by governments other than one’s own.69  
This phenomenon of state building as crisis response appears in many such 
contemporary examples such as Iraq, Afghanistan, Israel, Bosnia, Kosovo, Haiti, and 
Somalia.70  This has resulted in the transformation of many state militaries to drift from 
war-fighting towards state building due to the necessity to “take on a range of 
functions—law enforcement, economic regulation, tax collection, census taking, 
magazine publishing, political party registration, food aid distribution, and so on—that 
have little to do with traditional defense responsibilities.”71  As Mary Callahan suggests 
in describing the Burmese military state-building project, balancing these developing 
military capabilities and civilian participation is the key to governance at both a local and 
regional level.72  Another shared theme is the lack of institutional memory or the inability 
to apply a model for state building, even as the world witnesses the same few great 
powers partake in the vast majority of state-building projects.  This is disheartening given 
the fact the United States has participated in numerous state-building projects, all of 
which are well documented and heavily critiqued; compounded by the fact that state 
building as a formal practice is only about fifty to sixty years old.73 
The history of state building as crisis response demonstrates the multitude of 
security implications during the process to build capacity for governance.  The security 
question must be addressed as an internal requirement to maintain an environment of 
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relative safety in order to meet the expectations of the populace.  Security must also be 
addressed as the ability to project power at a minimum to ensure survival of the state 
from external aggression.  As Philip Bobbitt states in his vast discourse on the history and 
complexities of the state in, The Shield of Achilles, “a State that could neither protect its 
citizens from crime nor protect its homeland from attack by other states would have 
ceased to fulfill its most basic reason for being.”74  The development of security is a 
major point of friction in the design of the state-building project unique to each particular 
circumstance.  
The introduction of foreign military power is hardly an ever-welcomed package in 
any state-building project and is met with stringent critique and suspicion from the 
internal population as well as members of the coalition and those states not included in 
the force package.  The examples of this are many such as Russia, China, Iran, and 
Pakistan’s suspicions about U.S. involvement in Afghanistan.  The situation is 
exacerbated by a lack of mission clarity, such as counterinsurgency, man hunting, or state 
building due to crisis generated responses and an absence of overt policy design.  The 
length of time the forces will be present and what their contributions are to the project are 
debated from the time force is introduced until well after the last foreign service member 
leaves the state, if the foreign military presence ever completely leaves.  This is 
exacerbated if the intentions of the external powers are not made clear, the mission is ill 
defined, and/or a level of perceived stability to facilitate the rest of the project is not met.  
Unilateral action obviously draws more scrutiny than does a multilateral commitment 
from the international community under the guise of the United Nations. 
D. CONCLUSION 
Recent history in regards to state building is in sharp contrast to many calls for 
sustainable solutions for state building such as “a systemic effort on the part of the United 
States as well as its multilateral partners to develop interagency doctrine and associated 
command and control arrangements that would permit their routine use in post Cold War 
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crises.”75  In the absence of guiding principles, but under the strain of real world efforts 
two general trends have emerged in the literature focused on the design of state building.  
This is either a top down approach imposed by external powers or a bottom up approach 
facilitated by external powers.  Toby Dodge states that the contemporary dynamics of 
externally driven state building assumes a ‘top down’ design.76  The realistic needs of the 
external stakeholders involved, and the necessity for ‘fit’ in regional and global 
accommodations support state building imposed from the top down.  
This top down approach is in sharp contrast to the bottom up state-building 
agenda promoted by Ghani and Lockhart.  They promote a framework “for a citizen-
based approach to state building: a new legal compact between citizen, state and the 
market, not a top-down imposition of the state.”77  The critique of such a citizen based 
approach is the lack of initial capacity, security, and capital.  If the state could be built 
from the bottom up, then we would be saturated by examples of citizen based models for 
development throughout the underdeveloped regions of the world.  State building must 
come from the top down, even through coercive measures if necessary, in order to 
properly develop capacity for domestic and international benefit.  A top-down approach 
also allows for the government to establish legitimacy through expansive processes of 
development.  This approach of course is reliant on the ability of security and growth to 
generate consensus and political legitimacy. 
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IV. MYANMAR 
There is a growing debate about the relationship between the implementation and 
management of ICT by various governments on the one hand and economic development 
outcomes and/or the degree of political stability on the other hand.  This chapter will 
focus on Myanmar.  It will demonstrate that an authoritarian government with a strong 
incentive to implement restrictive policies in relation to ICT can mitigate the liberalizing 
effects generally associated with ICT penetration and growth.  ICT penetration in 
Myanmar in its current highly regulated form serves to reinforce the status quo and only 
marginally enhances the opportunity for liberal reform and improved development.  
However, it will also be argued that the use of repressive practices by the state of 
Myanmar may in time be challenged through a combination of internal dissent and 
external pressures calling for transparency that, at least in part, utilizes ICT to further a 
more liberal agenda.  To put it another way, the military government of Myanmar is an 
authoritarian dictatorship that clearly seeks to retain power and, at best, pays lip service 
to democracy and political openness.  In this context, does the policy framework used by 
the military regime to govern the role of ICT contribute to the goals of political stability 
and/or development?  Myanmar then, is an important case study because it demonstrates 
a number of key issues.  First, it draws attention to the importance of ICT policy versus 
ICT infrastructure.  Second, it highlights the continued relevance of the approach taken 
by the government to control ICT.  More specifically, it makes clear the ability of the 
state to create and manage investment plans that lack plurality or competition, and the 
inability of ICT growth alone to incrementally promote transparency and efficiency.  
More generally, the case of Myanmar raises questions about whether there is a 
straightforward connection between the pursuit of ICT and the increased connectivity of 
the population and the governing body along intra-state, regional, or global lines of 
communication, information sharing, and commerce. 
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A. ICT POLICY – MAINTAINING A STATE OF INSTABILITY 
The present government of Myanmar came to power in 1988 after the Burmese 
military took control of the country and established rule as the State Law and Order 
Restoration Council (SLORC), eventually renaming itself the State Peace and 
Development Council (SPDC) in 1997.78  The SPDC controls the only ICT Company in 
Myanmar, called the Myanmar Posts and Telecommunications (MTC), which falls under 
the Ministry of Communications, Posts, and Telegraphs and is chaired by a minister who 
currently is Brigadier General Thein Zaw.79  Myanmar’s Internet penetration rate was 0.1 
percent with an Internet user growth rate of 3,900 percent as of March 2008.80  
Additionally, Myanmar has experienced a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 
14.3% in main telephone lines and a CAGR of 56.7% in mobile cellular subscribers from 
2001 through 2006.81  This rapid growth has occurred under highly volatile political and 
economic conditions.  The low penetration rate and low level of stability in Myanmar 
illustrates the positive correlation between the rate of ICT penetration and level of 
stability.   
At the same time, Myanmar may well be considered a state in transition due to the 
drafting of a new constitution, and small incremental steps undertaken to conform to 
international pressure for change,82 although an argument will be made suggesting quite 
the opposite.  Figure 4 demonstrates the improvement in political stability witnessed 
during the corresponding growth in ICT showing Myanmar ranked in the 13th percentile 
in 1996 subsequently improving to the 24th percentile of politically stable countries by 
2006.83 
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Figure 3.   Myanmar Political Stability 1996-200684 
 
 
On the surface, this assessment appears highly optimistic, but upon further inquiry 
the reality is that Burma/Myanmar emerged as an independent nation-state in 1948, 
experiencing significant internal challenges to governance, and has been identified at 
various times over the decades as a modernizing society in transition.85  The challenge of 
development in Myanmar demonstrates the difficulty in embracing those ideals rooted in 
aspects of modernization theory suggesting that, “correct nation-building strategies would 
ensure traditional loyalties, such as ethnic allegiance would fade and new loyalties to the 
modern nation would become the central element of every citizen’s identity.”86  The 
current relationship between the SPDC and their constituents prove otherwise.  Mary 
Callahan presents a compelling account of this relationship and the subsequent impact on 
state building in her book Making Enemies, which suggests that the dynamic between the 
SPDC and their constituents is a result of the historical processes involved in Myanmar.  
More specifically, the coercion-intensive environment of contemporary Myanmar is 
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attributable to the post-conflict environment where “warfare created state institutions that 
in many situations cannot distinguish between citizens and enemies of the state.”87  
Presently, the SPDC maintains absolute control over every aspect of governance 
to include those sectors of social, corporate, and government ICT.  The desire of the 
SPDC to retain this absolute authority puts them in a solid position given the almost non-
existence ICT infrastructure prior to their arrival to power.  That is, the SPDC has been 
able to shape ICT capability to suit their needs in order to meet their ends through the 
implementation of such laws as the Electronic Transactions Law in 2004 providing a 
legal framework for electronic data transmission and storage.  This law allows 
connectivity and communication, while at the same time creating government 
enforceable standards through subjecting the user to criminal action for electronic 
conduct both within the borders of Myanmar and internationally as well.88 
B. IN PURSUIT OF POLITICAL STABILITY 
The state then, maintains a high level of relevance in managing the political 
impact of ICT through the adoption of liberalizing, moderate, or restrictive ICT 
policies.89  The ICT penetration in Myanmar in the current highly regulated form serves 
to reinforce the status quo and only marginally enhances the opportunity for reform and 
improved development.  The SPDC acts to mitigate those measures identified for 
successful liberalizing development through substantially blocking any opportunity for 
ICT to influence the political situation or induce social change in a manner consistent 
with the desires of the population.90  This restrictive management of ICT is conducted 
through controlling and monitoring access, content, and freedom of choice over 
information that conflicts with the ideology of the SPDC and might result in the 
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dissolution of the SPDC’s monopoly on power.91  This strategy is bounded by what the 
SPDC can control, as international activist collectives utilizing the Internet have 
demonstrated the capability to influence state development such as convincing one major 
Western company to pull out of Burma.92  Given more time, this restrictive policy in the 
face of regional ICT penetration should support a positive relationship between stability 
and level of ICT penetration so long as the SPDC takes steps to liberalize the current 
policies governing ICT. 
The SPDC justifies the restrictive policies for ICT management as necessary to 
maintain control of the state.  The SPDC, derived from the military, maintains existing 
control through coercion and corruption by maintaining a monopoly of physical power 
and information control.93  Myanmar has a complicated history of insurgency and drug 
trafficking.  Jeff Goodwin describes the condition in Myanmar as an example of 
“persistent insurgency,” stating that, “several ethnic separatist groups have been at war 
with the Burmese state almost continuously since the country attained independence from 
Britain in 1948.”94  Much literature is available on the negative impact upon stability 
armed insurgencies can have on weak central governments.95  This situation is further 
exacerbated by the existence of mature criminal organizations in Myanmar, which are 
reportedly so large that an accurate assessment of the extent of their impact upon trade 
and the country’s economy is unavailable.96  Accepting and maintaining this status quo 
places the SPDC in a favorable condition to produce ICT policy that favors and promotes 
a state monopoly of power.  The SPDC are able to take advantage of changes in 
telecommunications and manage transparency to further blend legal and illegal money, 
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thereby complicating the task of international monitoring, and maintain the balance of 
forces in favor of state allowed crime and corruption.97  
SPDC monopoly of power extends to the population in many forms through the 
utilization of the growing ICT infrastructure.  Media outlets are state owned and vetted 
by the government in order to produce a propaganda style of news.98  Internet is censored 
to allow access only to state approved mediums thereby controlling access to information 
and subjecting the user to monitoring for use inconsistent with the ideals of the state.  For 
example, websites such as Google, Yahoo, and Hotmail are banned from use by the 
SPDC with no reason provided.99  The enforcement of such regulations is very real 
indeed as one “supporter of the Burmese pro-democracy movement reportedly died in 
prison, where he was being held for the crime of using a fax machine without a 
license.”100  Additionally, the SPDC maintains a formidable monopoly of access to 
communication outside of the state through the promotion of their controlled Internet 
which allows the government “new access to the global debate to counter accusations 
against it more effectively.”101  
The SPDC though, even with their current monopoly on power and information 
has demonstrated a willingness to liberalize ICT policies mainly in order to diffuse 
international sentiment thereby opening the door for reform.  This is demonstrated 
through recent episodes that highlight the inability of the state to maintain absolute 
control over segments of the population which feel discontent towards the SPDC.  The 
SPDC has eased earlier policy restrictions on ICT such as the Computer Science 
Development Law of 1996, which imposed an automatic jail term of 7 to 15 years for 
computer use or possession without government permission.102  The access to ICT by 
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many members of opposition groups has facilitated their ability to capture events inside 
Myanmar, and project them to the rest of the world generating sympathy and funding.103  
Much of this work occurs in neighboring states such as Thailand, where expatriated 
opposition leaders are then able to develop connectivity on a global level, generating 
resources and foreign policies sympathetic to their cause.104  “The virtual community of 
Burmese dissidents revolves around a few web sites, such as BurmaNet, that carry the 
most up-to-date information about the struggle, as well as background materials for 
newcomers and journalists.”105  Over time, this coupling of internal dissent and growing 
external disapproval of the SPDC furthers the likelihood of reform and development at a 
pace unimaginable prior to the introduction of ICT technology.  
C. IN PURSUIT OF DEVELOPMENT 
Myanmar ICT policies exemplify the limits of technologically enabled 
globalization and provide evidence for Ghemawat’s argument about semi-globalization 
and the continued importance of borders in the near term.106  That is, a development or 
state building strategy founded on global or regional standardization does not bode well 
with authoritarian parties such as the SPDC who seek to maintain power through a set of 
norms and practices unique among the more liberal polities of the region.  The inability 
and unwillingness of the SPDC to conform to an internationally accepted framework of 
ICT development serves as a constraint for development, while at the same time 
reinforces the monopoly of state sanctioned control over the population.  As Nina 
Hachigian states in The Internet and Power in One-party East Asian States, “any 
incremental growth from ICT is not worth the political risk to regimes that rely on 
controlling information dissemination to the public.”107  This constraint for development 
appears in many forms such as discouraging foreign investment through a lack of 
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available ICT infrastructure to facilitate efficient business practices.108  With such a 
monopoly on power and information, the SPDC is able to remain corrupt and further a 
poor human rights record due to the extent of their control over the development of ICT.  
The SPDC balances the undertones of dissent with state sanctioned attempts at 
modernization in order to appeal to broad popular support utilizing ICT to facilitate social 
services such as education and enhancing connectivity.  The SPDC has undertaken many 
modernization projects and innovation creating approaches to expand ICT infrastructure 
in order to further development.  For example, a fiber optic cable has been laid 
connecting Yangon and Mandalay with plans to eventually link all major cities in 
Myanmar.109  The MTC has also begun pilot programs establishing domestic long 
distance telephone calls through domestic satellite service.110  Government agencies also 
have the capability to conduct procurements via the Internet from all levels of sourcing in 
order to promote efficiency.111  These steps may collectively increase participation in 
government and could provide the space to foster liberal advancements towards less 
authoritarian rule. 
These ICT policies of the SPDC also promote an extensive amount of self-
imposed isolation allowing the state to narrowly focus the development of state 
partnerships with those regional states whose interests and goals may align with their 
own.  This may explain the developing relationship between China and Myanmar 
occurring without much interference from the international community due to the 
exclusivity of the two states, China’s commercial interests in Myanmar, and China’s 
position on the UN Security Council.112  The authoritarian nature of the SPDC has 
fostered this bilateral relationship with China by reducing the number of state and 
economic stakeholders involved.  
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D. CONCLUSION 
Myanmar is one of the most authoritarian states in the world and the government 
is viewed by most observers as harsh and unstable.  The Failed State Index for 2008 
ranks Myanmar 12 out of 177 in terms of state instability.113  Despite its high level of 
instability the government of Myanmar (SPDC) has demonstrated a tremendous amount 
of resilience in the face of significant internal and international pressure to improve 
human rights and move towards liberal democracy.  A major reason for the staying power 
of the SPDC is their monopoly on both power and information.  Its implementation of 
restrictive ICT policies and ICT development plans reinforces the state monopoly on 
information.  By pursuing these policies, the SPDC seeks to maintain the status quo while 
at the same time furthering the form of economic development of their choosing, with 
regional partnerships free of open market stakeholder interference.  In this way, the 
SPDC is able to maintain their hold on power, which for the government is more 
important than some abstract notion of political stability.  This is done at the expense of 
individual freedoms through the strict management of all facets of ICT infrastructure and 
ICT policy.  This results in a clash between the desire by the state for autonomy or 
isolation and the push by ICT introduction for connectivity at the regional or global level. 
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V. MALAYSIA 
The previous chapter focused on Myanmar and the relationship between political 
stability and the ICT policy practiced by the military junta.  This chapter will explore the 
same themes of political stability and ICT policy with a focus on Malaysia.  Malaysia is a 
one party state ruled with all the formal mechanisms and institutions of a constitutional 
democracy.  Like Burma/Myanmar, what became Malaysia also experienced a relatively 
long period of formal and informal English colonial rule.  The English colonial period for 
Malaysia extended from 1824 until 1963.114  During this period, what would become 
Malaysia absorbed many of the governmental traditions of the British such as the practice 
of common law.115  Unlike in Myanmar where the military junta promoted restrictive 
ICT policies from the onset, Malaysia began with minimal restrictions on the content and 
access of ICT; however, over the years successive governments have introduced 
measures to limit the freedoms enjoyed by the population in regards to access and 
content.  This trend provides some insight into political stability in Malaysia as the 
government manages the expectations of an ethnically diverse constituency.  
Malaysia is an important case study because it serves as an example for those who 
argue ICT can contribute or reinforce state development and facilitate globalizing 
economies.  The lack of restriction on ICT in Malaysia stands in significant contrast to 
Myanmar.  Does the policy framework then, used by the government of Malaysia to 
govern the role of ICT contribute to the goals of political stability and/or development?  
This case study demonstrates a number of key issues.  First, it draws attention to the 
importance of ICT policy in generating and maintaining ICT infrastructure.  Second, as 
recent events in Malaysia have demonstrated, an amount of political risk is assumed in 
the liberalizing of ICT policy.  The challenge for Malaysia lies in the ability of the 
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government to lure investment in order to increase ICT capacity, while simultaneously 
managing the recent growth of organized dissent among the Islamic population without 
invoking the perception of a targeted reduction in civil liberties. 
A. MALAYSIA: A BRIEF BACKGROUND 
Malaysia is a federation of thirteen states mainly consisting of Malay, Chinese, 
and Indian ethnicities.  The cultural diversity runs deep due to the geographical 
disposition of the population across the Malay Peninsula and the island of Borneo.  A 
shared history of British colonial rule is arguably the only historical precedence for 
political, economic, and cultural commonality.  Uniting such a diverse political landscape 
posed a significant challenge for the government in the process of creating a Malaysian 
identity.  The containment and reduction of insurgency in the years prior to the British 
departure created a sense of ‘combat-fatigue’ among the population, thereby planting the 
seeds for the necessity of a strong central government.  James Scott describes the 
prevailing popular desire for a strong central government in post-emergency Malaysia 
(1948-1957/60) and after the consolidation of power by noting that “the long shadow of 
violence has thus contributed to the fear that the stability that now exists is a tenuous 
achievement—that security and order could easily collapse.”116  
The perceived success of political stability did come without cost as Malaysia 
experienced a painful transition to an independent state that included a Communist 
insurgency that sought, unsuccessfully to build up support beyond its core base of ethnic 
Chinese.117  In the wake of the emergency era, the government pursued an aggressive 
policy to raise production levels of agrarian stock, further diversify the economy, and 
improve social services in order to offset the abundance of poverty due to a reliance on 
agricultural sustainment and rapid population growth.118  In 1971, the government 
introduced the New Economic Policy (NEP) with the two fold objectives of poverty 
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eradication and reduction of socio-economic disparity along racial lines.119  Due to the 
expected decrease in potential for growth in the production sector, the New Economic 
Policy recognized “the need for rapid growth in the modern sector” as the only viable 
solution for the attainment of these national objectives.120  The NEP was in turn followed 
by the National Development Policy (NDP) in 1991, which expanded upon the unity and 
poverty reduction strategies of the NEP while emphasizing a shift to embrace growth 
managed by the private sector.121  
The economic successes of the 1970-1980s, the financial crisis of 1990s, and the 
present surge of national investment in technological development, has provided a record 
of economic resiliency for the central government of Malaysia.  Additionally, the 
presence of significant economic disparity among the population of Malaysia has 
exposed the limits of liberal policy against the backdrop of maintaining political stability 
at the expense of this instituted liberalism.  The capacities for government to achieve 
such aims are strengthened due to the executive dominance enhancing the efficacy of the 
state role in development.122 
The United Malays National Organization (UMNO) is the dominant political 
party in the Barisan Nasional (BN) and has been ruling the country through an 
accommodation system since independence.123  Technically, considered a democracy, 
Malaysia is governed more accurately as a quasi-authoritarian state due to the BN’s grip 
on the parliamentary system.124  The BN government has introduced numerous policies 
in order to strengthen their position as the ruling coalition such as discontinuing 
municipal elections and utilizing their monopoly on the media to process disinformation 
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campaigns against political opposition.125  The UMNO then, delicately manages an 
alliance reflecting the diverse cross section of the Malaysian demographic landscape. 
B. MALAYSIA’S ICT POLICY, “OF THE PEOPLE, FOR THE PEOPLE, 
FOR NOW…” 
Malaysia’s contemporary ICT policy is focused on serving as the cornerstone for 
a broader social and economic development plan.  This policy represents “an increasing 
shift from control to regulation, with an emphasis on accountability and transparency.”126  
In this way, Malaysia has demonstrated the strategic foresight necessary in producing 
policy advantageous towards state development and regional relevance.  Malaysia 
demonstrates the benefits of practicing widely distributed growth-enhancing policies 
coupled with the legitimate assurance from the state of shared growth dividends among 
both business and the individual.127  Unlike many states in various stages of 
development, Malaysia bet the house on a singular vision reflected in the reliance of the 
state on the success of the technology sector.  This began in the form of policy 
development and implementation designed to “help Malaysia leapfrog from an industrial 
society to a post-industrial one, by passing the ‘developed society’ phase.”128  This is 
accomplished by embracing a “geographical accumulation strategy to promote and 
regulate industrial restructuring within major urban areas,” thereby demonstrating state 
recognition of urban-regional development as paramount under the auspice of 
globalization.129  
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Malaysia’s Internet penetration rate was 37.9 percent with an Internet user growth 
rate of 302.8 percent as of March 2008.130  Additionally, Malaysia has experienced a 
compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of -1.6% in main telephone lines and a CAGR of 
21.4% in mobile cellular subscribers from 2001 through 2006.131  The Malaysian 
government has underlined the ‘success’ of their policy initiatives by stating that their 
“telecommunications network is more advanced than any other in South East Asia with 
the exception of Singapore.”132  The majority of this effort is conducted or managed by 
Telekom Malaysia (TM), the present day embodiment of the Malayan 
Telecommunications Department (MTD).  The MTD was originally formed in 1946 and 
served as a state owned monopoly until 1994.133  Since then, Malaysia has allowed the 
introduction of competitors, but TM still maintains more than a 95% share of the 
market.134 
Malaysia’s main ICT focus is promoted as Malaysia’s Vision 2020.  “First 
announced in February 1991, Vision 2020 mapped out the Malaysian government’s 
intention to engage in a large scale process of national development and wealth 
creation.”135  This would in turn enable Malaysia to achieve the goal of recognition as a 
‘fully developed country’ by the year 2020.136  Vision 2020 is further projected as “one 
of the most aggressive and comprehensive ICT plans in the world, and faces one of the 
greatest challenges: using ICT to address the economic development hurdles of a highly 
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rural developing country.”137  These challenges have proven formidable to the Malaysian 
government in their effort to meet the expectations of the rural population and have been 
addressed through tremendous levels of investment in educational infrastructure to 
further develop internal access and innovation.138  This national project has led to many 
major developmental policy initiatives, including the ambitious state endeavor known as 
the Multimedia Super Corridor (MSC).  
Malaysian Prime Minister Dato’ Sri Dr Mahathir Mohamad publicly declared a 
national project to foster the growth of information and multimedia technology known as 
the Multimedia Super Corridor (MSC) in August 1996.139  The MSC would become a 
geographic focal point serving as the regional base for high tech corporations and an 
enabling environment fostering the emerging innovations of the technology sector.140  
The Malaysian government has worked at length to promote the MSC, creating a Bill of 
Guarantees meant to protect ICT growth from policy.  The Bill of Guarantees is 
comprised of ten statutes designed to augment the promotion of the MSC, including 
unrestricted employment of local and foreign knowledge workers and the assurance of no 
Internet censorship.141  This is in stark contrast to the careful control of print and 
television media by the Malaysian government.142  The impact of this un-restrictive 
policy and the unrelenting pursuit of ICT development have placed the Malaysian 
government in a difficult position.  For example, the persistent theme of exclusion among 
everyday Malaysians in benefiting from this path to modernity and participating in the 
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decision-making process working to transform their society and livelihood reinforces 
underpinned feelings of discontent among major segments of the indigenous 
population.143  The government’s management of this perceived exclusivity must result 
in tangible action versus rhetoric or face the possibility of isolating large segments of 
their population on the periphery of the MSC, thereby physically bounding both the 
breadth and depth of Malaysia’s national vision of a knowledge society.  
C. INTRODUCED RESTRICTION AND THE PURSUIT OF EXTENDED 
STABILITY 
The experience of Malaysia has demonstrated the tendency to cede some level of 
control by the state relative to the rise of a knowledge-based economy under one-party 
rule or an authoritarian state.  Figure 5 demonstrates the drop and recovery from the 
Asian market crisis in political stability witnessed during the corresponding growth in 
ICT showing Malaysia ranked in the 65.4 percentile in 1996, and subsequently slipping 
to the 58.7 percentile of politically stable countries by 2006.144 
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Figure 4.   Malaysia Political Stability 1996-2006145 
 
 
The current trend in political stability is of course due to numerous challenges 
concerning the process of governance.  One of the most significant challenges facing the 
government of Malaysia in their pursuit of technologically based development is the 
resultant exclusivity of marginalized population and the perceived inability of Malays to 
exercise control over the forces which shape their lives.  Muslims are one such 
demographic receiving significant attention as of late due to the rising level of Islamic 
extremism witnessed in the Asia Pacific region and the transnational spread of associated 
violence.  This may be explained by the dynamics occurring in managing the social 
conflict experienced during the politicization of Islam in a state such as Malaysia, which 
promotes secular ideals in order to enhance development, while at the same time 
promoting the inclusion of the influential Muslim community.  The Malaysian 
government is constantly trying to balance formal secularism against the demands of 
political Islam.  Zachary Abuza notes that “Islam has always been under state control in 
Malaysia, and the ulamas have always chafed at having sharia law being superseded by 
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secular law.”146  Political Islam in Malaysia has recently embraced the network and 
communication enablers provided by ICT.  The recent downward trend in political 
stability correlates then with the government’s current exploratory methods aimed at the 
control of ICT access and content to circumvent and contain the religious vent of the 
rural based populations and their fundamentalist ideals.  At present, Malaysia is pursuing 
exploratory methods in order to introduce new communication and content laws in order 
to control the spread of “disharmony, chaos, seditious material, and lies,”147 currently 
occurring on the Internet with the intent to undermine the control of the state. 
D. CONCLUSION 
Malaysia serves to reinforce the notion of an increasingly highly connected global 
structure in which ICT plays an ever-growing role.  The maintenance of state stability in 
Malaysia relies heavily on the success of the national ICT project promoted by the state.  
Challenges inherent in this national project such as exclusivity and wealth diffusion are 
not unique to development, and must be mitigated through policy directed at a growing 
middle class subject to one party rule.  Additionally, careful negotiation of the civil 
liberty realities wrought from the introduction of measured policy to control the 
advantages ICT provides to extremist groups must be traversed as the government 
continues on the path toward becoming a knowledge based society.  The government of 
Malaysia must act and practice governance to meet the expectations of their stated 
visions concerning ICT development for both the population and the foreign investment it 
desires to attract, or inevitably succumb to the authoritarian practices necessary to control 
popular dissent should these expectations prove fruitless.  The case of Malaysia 
demonstrates the vital importance of local policy in spite of the perceived decreasing 
relevance of the state within the context of globalization.  Malaysia then, is an example of 
where the successful expansion and deepening of ICT and the maintenance of political 
stability are directly connected. 
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VI. REGIONAL FRAMEWORKS 
Since at least the end of the Cold War regional economic and political initiatives 
have emerged as part of either an effort to advance globalization and/or to mitigate the 
impact globalization has had on the sovereign nation-state.  Regional organizations have, 
to varying degrees, allowed nation-states to strengthen their position in a globalizing 
world, while providing a transitional framework for the standardization and other aspects 
of globalization at a sub-global and a transnational level.  Regional integration and 
standardization enables connectivity to occur along regional lines, while still facilitating 
the U.S.-led globalization project.  However, like globalization, regional organizations 
and regional integration has been very uneven, and those parts of the world where states 
are weak or failing are also usually those parts of the world where regional organizations 
are also weakest or completely absent. 
This chapter builds upon the concern in previous chapters in which the 
importance of state building to globalization was emphasized via a close examination of 
the relationship between ICT and political stability.  This chapter argues that one of the 
key ways in which state building can be best facilitated is via the use or creation of 
regional organizations or frameworks.  It begins by emphasizing that there is more than 
ever a need for regional solutions, and then sets out to shift state-building policy design 
away from crisis response towards emerging state assistance and state building within a 
regional framework.  The chapter highlights the advantages of a regional framework for 
assisting emerging states and state building via the use of the Hourglass Model.  This 
Model, it is suggested, can provide a framework for policy design.  It is argued that a 
regional approach to state building harnesses those attributes of globalization, such as 
standardization, to the need to garner or retain national and local sovereignty on the part 
of the majority of the population.  Finally, upon establishing a viable construct for the 
utility of the regional framework, the chapter makes clear how ICT provides one of the 
necessary enablers so that we can actually apply the regional approach to state building.  
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A. ALL PROBLEMS ARE REGIONAL 
There are numerous contemporary examples of state crises, state collapse and 
state failure such as Somalia, Iraq and Afghanistan, that are clearly best understood and 
addressed as regional problems.148  In each case, a reactive crisis response approach was 
utilized to deal with insecurity, and promote state building with little or no input, not only 
from the people who lived within the borders of the state concerned, but also from the 
nation-states in the immediate region and/or their citizens.  As each new crisis 
demonstrates, a policy focus on the individual state can lead to a certain degree of 
capacity building, but soon becomes constrained by an inability to “change the basic 
motivations or objectives of the local states.”149  
This approach is also flawed as the problems generated by the state in crisis spill 
across its territorial borders.  As one author has observed, “(t)he domain of the state is 
seen to be one of accommodation and contest by innumerable and contending sites of 
power embedded in society at the regional and sub-regional levels.”150  State crises 
quickly move to regional levels due to the degree of connectivity between the state and 
other regional members.  In other cases, the origins of the crisis lay at the regional level, 
until a member state provides the proper mix of facilitating factors necessary to generate 
crisis.  As a result, a change in economic policy, the level of political stability, and social 
change occurring within the state all have profound impacts upon the region as a whole.  
As the President of the United States observed in 2002 in the formal and generally annual 
National Security Strategy of the United States of America: “(i)n an increasingly 
interconnected world, regional crises can strain our alliances, rekindles rivalries among 
the major powers, and create horrifying affronts to human dignity.”151  Benjamin Miller, 
in States, Nations, and the Great Powers, defines a region as a construct based on two 
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conditions: “(1) a certain degree of geographical proximity and (2) strategic interaction or 
security interdependence.”152  This definition of a region suggests a level of social and 
political connectivity already available as a resource for security and development.  The 
crucial importance of the regional approach is that it offers a more realistic understanding 
of the dynamics and implications of a particular state crisis, setting it in a regional 
context, which is a more appropriate organizational level at which to deal with the crisis 
and to engage in one or more state-building projects. 
B. FAILING, FAILED, OR SIMPLY EMERGING? 
State building as crisis response is not conducive to achieving long term success, 
nor does it capture the regional character of the problems that underpin most failing or 
failed states.  In fact, terms such as ‘failing’ or ‘failed’ states, or ‘reconstruction’, add to 
the perception that there was once a viable, even strong state in place.  In fact, while 
some failing states may have possessed far more capacity in the past, there are just as 
many that have been weak and failing since they gained independence if we are talking 
about former colonies, or were never unified nation-states in the case of buffer states such 
as Afghanistan.  The starting point then is to recognize that many states labeled as failed 
or failing were never stable self-sustaining entities of governance to begin with.  That is, 
there never existed a compact between the government and its constituents/citizens, let 
alone a functioning compact between the particular state concerned and the international 
community.  Additionally, reconstruction assumes there was once ‘something’ in place to 
reconstruct.  States exist at varying levels of development or a lack thereof.  
A terminology that captures the challenges associated with state building and the 
long-term strategic foresight necessary for success is desperately needed.  A term such as 
‘emerging state’ is more accurate than failed state and also sets to one side issues of 
‘nation’ versus ‘region’ and focuses on the more immediate need to engage in creating 
institutional capacity for the delivery of security and development at all levels, from the 
local to the regional.  Benchmarks and incentives could thus be provided to the emerging 
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state and regional players in order to facilitate a multi-lateral design with a unilateral 
direction conducive to achieving long-term development.  This shift in emphasis towards 
the region might also help embed more long-term measures and goals for success instead 
of the short-term political calculus that so often informs the theory and practice of state 
building.  The regional framework for state building should take a long-term approach, 
shifting the focus from crisis response to sustained practices and a regional body 
designed to coordinate resources and policy while addressing the local realities that are 
central to successful state building. 
C. REGIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR EMERGING STATE ASSISTANCE 
Figure 5.   Hourglass Model 
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The REGION represents those states with strategic interaction and geographic 
proximity to the ‘emerging state’.153  At the regional level, capacity represents the 
pooled resource capacity of the region consisting mainly of the fiscal, institutional, and 
economic capability member states may possess to contribute to the advancement of the 
state-building project.  Consensus represents cooperative action at the regional level of 
governance as well as the degree of popular support among the domestic constituency of 
each member state.  The relationship between consensus and capacity, or in other words, 
organized cooperation for growth represents the amount of social capital available.154  
Additionally, contributions from Great Powers, or international organizations, for 
‘emerging states’ in relation to both capacity and consensus are rolled up as regional 
attributes falling under the respective domain of either political support (consensus) or 
investment/aid to include security force assistance (capacity).  The amount of capacity 
and consensus drives the formulation of policy.  At the same time, ideally, policy is 
derived from multilateral involvement but leads to unilateral direction.  Ultimately, this is 
still a top down formulation for state building, but one with attentiveness to local 
concerns and set in a regional framework.  The success of the overall policy for 
‘emerging state’ assistance further serves to reinforce capacity through creating 
conditions for the expansion of capacity across the region.  Successful policy also serves 
to further shape regional consensus as the people in both the key crisis zones and the 
region as a whole begin to receive the benefits from stability, security and development. 
The state represents the level at which this policy is implemented to generate 
both domestic capacity and consensus.  This occurs in a multitude of ways such as 
political reconciliation and constitutional development serving to strengthen the 
legitimacy of the government in order to build consensus.  Additionally, infrastructure, 
institutional and economic policies may serve to build the capacity of the emerging state.  
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These processes serve to create and build upon the resulting social capital of the 
emerging state.  Policy at the state level is also reinforced from increased capacity and 
additionally shaped by the consensus of the population.  This suggests that state policy 
must be flexible due to the dynamic character of these processes.  The Hourglass Model 
also draws attention to the need for a reciprocal flow of capital with higher levels of 
capital obviously flowing into the emerging state, and the shifting of a certain degree of 
sovereignty upwards from the state to the regional framework.  At the same time the 
regional framework needs to be organized in a fashion that ensures it receives policy 
input from the national and local level through channels that are open and understood by 
all concerned.  The major attribute of a regional framework is its potential ability to 
generate security and development utilizing both existing and new linkages among 
member states and other groups in the region. 
The utility of a regional approach to state building is reinforced by Benjamin 
Miller’s emphasis on the importance and vigor of the dynamics of any given region: 
Regional dynamics are shaped by patterns of relations among regional 
states (notably, those of amity and enmity), by the nature of the regional 
conflicts (ideological, territorial, nationalist, hegemonic, security dilemma, 
etc.), and by the domestic attributes of the local states (democratic or 
authoritarian regimes, state-society relations, and the demands of state-
building and nation-building, regime stability, and elite security).155 
The regional framework takes advantage of both the geographical proximity and 
international connectivity critical in ensuring sustained political will for the state-building 
project, while not losing sight of the specific needs of any given locality.  The Hourglass 
Model also affords the management of resource and time to regional governance.  The 
model seeks to address many of the current challenges to state building by clear 
delineations of authority, the pooled capacity of a region, and the fundamental 
importance of working towards consensus for regional stability and growth.  Regardless 
of how intractable the problems might be getting all the stakeholders, high and low, 
talking is a crucial first step and it has to take place at the regional level and also bring in 
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actors from outside the region if they are relevant to the process.  It needs to rely from the 
outset on the cooperation of member states which, regardless of their national and often 
self-aggrandizing agendas, it is assumed can establish a base line around agreeing to seek 
progressive stability and security and the creation of additional markets for commerce 
with a general view that there is a need to move towards an improvement in development 
broadly understood.  
Focused policy design and implementation are necessary in order to balance the 
interaction among regional member states with their competing domestic requirements.  
Multilateralism is an inherent component of the regional framework, while working 
towards the promotion of a clearly defined single direction vital for emerging state 
assistance.156  A unilateral direction would address the unity of command challenges so 
prevalent in contemporary state-building endeavors such as Iraq and Afghanistan. 
The critical component of the regional framework is the necessity for expanded 
time horizons due to the long term character of success in state building.  The Hourglass 
Model in Figure 6 is built upon the importance of seeing this as both a medium and long 
term process.  The implied change inherent in this model is that the regional framework 
or organization sets the timeline and controls the acquisition and distribution of resources 
for security and development.  This approach is in stark contrast to the current, often 
poorly managed Great Power-led and private sector and NGO executed state-building 
endeavors that are taking place in various parts of the world. 
D. HARNESSING STANDARDIZATION TO ENABLE EFFICIENCIES 
The standardized policies of contemporary globalization generate friction when 
they are unable to accommodate local processes and often generate wealth accumulation 
among elites without any discernable benefits to the majority of the population.  A 
regional framework for emerging state assistance should address the latter problem at the 
same time as it promotes standardization at the regional level in order to maximize 
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efficiency among member states.  This may occur in areas such as economic policy, 
infrastructure development, and security functions.  A transition to a single currency, 
shared distribution of industry, and regional programs to alleviate poverty are just a few 
economic programs that could generate economic promise against the backdrop of a 
regional commitment to security and development.  There would no longer various 
NGOs and aid organizations running funds and projects through different and/or 
competing social groups and/or state institutions without being part of a general bottom-
up regional framework with a clear overall goal in relation to security and development.  
In other words, not only would a state shift sovereignty to a regional framework, but the 
aid organizations of the world would shift their funds and agendas to the region for 
directed disbursement to the emerging state, at the same time as they would continue to 
have a say in what the primary objectives should be.  
An emerging state in many cases requires the capacity building that only a 
regional framework can deliver.  For example, the construction of road, rail, air, and port 
infrastructure needs to be designed to ensure compatibility within the regional context 
and beyond.  Capacity is also distributed from the region to the emerging state through 
technology transfer and job creation in the form of policies aimed at creating or 
improving upon capacities within the emerging state.  The focus on infrastructure and 
institutional development through investment with oversight by the regional body is 
important.  The success or failure becomes the responsibility of the regional body instead 
of international agencies or multinational corporations.  This shift in accountability 
allows for the introduction of regionalizing and globalizing mechanisms to serve state-
building agendas without delegitimizing the role of the state in delivering goods and 
services to the populace.  
Security provisions such as a non-aggression pact or security assistance grounded 
in a regional framework may provide the critical time and space necessary for the 
political and institutional development of an emerging state.  Additionally, the pursuit of 
common platforms for offensive and defensive capabilities produces cost benefits for all 
member states and facilitates inter-operability in the conduct of security measures.  
Regional security forces could help create the conditions necessary for capacity, 
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consensus, and political development in an emerging state.  Occupation of some sort is an 
initial requirement of security, and may generate less friction if conducted via the right 
mix of regional forces.  These regional security forces would act under regional directives 
in order to promote stability through the removal of rival power structures thereby 
providing the space for the development of local security apparatuses.  Cooperation at 
this level is not utopian.  It may require a certain degree of vision and a serious level of 
commitment, but it also represents an effective strategy for assisting emerging states and 
enhancing stability in the region as a whole. 
E. PROTECTING THE UNIQUENESS OF SOVEREIGNTY 
A recent trend in the literature concerning state building has been to focus on 
local development, and/or bottom-up state building.  Seth Kaplan, in Fixing Fragile 
States, emphasizes, “redesigning governing bodies to better fit local conditions—that is, 
connecting the state with its surrounding society—….to win legitimacy, develop 
competency, and encourage investment, the rule of law, and the other ingredients 
necessary to foster a self-sustaining, internally driven process that will lead to 
development.”157  Kaplan’s ten guiding principles for the reform of “fragile states” 
focuses on policies tailored for local conditions and on the necessity for regional 
participation.  Kaplan’s work hints at regional solutions throughout, but does not actually 
explore them in any detail.  The local does matter, and a regional framework designed to 
promote emerging state assistance must address the local variables in order to avoid 
cookie cutter solutions to state-building projects. 
At the same time, the region is crucial for local success.  And in order for regional 
bodies concerned with security and development to work, sovereignty will need to be 
shifted downwards to the local in some contexts and upwards to the region in others.  The 
regional framework, in turn, serves members well when demonstrating the “capacity to 
shape conceptions of ‘normal’ in international affairs in line with its unique normative 
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basis,” as demonstrated by the European Union (EU) model.158  That is, the regional 
approach works to standardize those processes which promote cooperation while at the 
same time shaping the normative functions of members to produce regional norms which 
still allow for both regional and sub-regional differences.  
The Hourglass Model relies on the shifting of sovereignty from the state to a 
regional body or framework.  The state, though, must still maintain a level of sovereignty 
to develop institutions unique to the more local social conditions, and exercise 
governance under a mandate provided by the constituent population. Richard Caplan 
describes this pursuit of balance between “international authority and local ownership of 
the processes of governance,” in International Governance of War-Torn Territories.159  
Although Caplan’s writing emphasizes the ‘international’ many of the functional 
characteristic he describes apply to the need for a balance between the sovereignty of the 
‘regional’ framework versus the national and the local. 
F. ICT ALLOWS REGIONAL FRAMEWORKS AN UNPRECEDENTED 
REALITY 
Regional frameworks are not new.  There are numerous historical precedents.  
What is new, at this juncture, is the potential utility of ICT and the transfer of technology 
among states as one of the main enablers for regional frameworks and emerging states.  
ICT facilitates just about every aspect of contemporary state building.  For 
example, ICT is central to the way in which global enterprises generate innovation and 
institutions.  They act as “agents of commercialization for new technology (both 
organizational and mechanical) worldwide,” which is necessary to the rapid 
implementation of state-building projects.160  Additionally, ICT presents the capability of 
Group Support Systems (GSS) to governance thereby, “improving organizational 
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effectiveness through their abilities to reduce communication barriers, increase 
productivity, and facilitate decision-making activities.”161  ICT also facilitates the state-
building endeavor of the external powers involved by effectively reducing the time for 
information sharing to real time allowing decision makers to constitute policy.  More 
broadly, the rapid growth of ICT in both capacity and capability generates tremendous 
potential “for organizing administration in terms of efficiency, transparency, and 
accountability.”162  This is due to the versatility of ICT, with an inherent ability to 
transcend barriers of geography, allowing users to harness benefits of scale and network 
effects, while simultaneously facilitating the transfer of knowledge.163  For the past few 
decades, ICT has increasingly come to the fore in shaping both industrial and agriculture 
production, not to mention political activity and social and cultural life.164  
The precept of revolutionary technologies enhancing the speed of communication 
and information sharing is not a new development.  The world has experienced the 
potential of modern technology with the telegraph of the early nineteenth century and the 
broadcast capability introduced with the invention of the radio followed by the invention 
of television.165  Each incremental leap in technology is accompanied with the familiar 
optimistic forecasts for peace, prosperity, and the social advancement of humankind.  
This is due to the widely held belief that “technology is the fastest medium to increase 
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economic outputs of a business or a country.”166  States generate benefits from 
connectivity through local agendas designed to transform themselves into knowledge-
based societies.  ICT also forces the state to focus on those institutional processes in order 
to fully take advantage of the technological capability.  For example, any national 
investment into ICT infrastructure generates a requirement for immediacy in educational 
development in order to properly maintain the infrastructure and shed the bonds designed 
to focus solely on unskilled production and contribute to the innovators of the world.  
This in turn generates tremendous potential for whatever direction the state-building 
project wishes to move: establishing or reconstituting an industrial capacity, agricultural 
production, or a strictly knowledge-based society or a combination of the three. 
This suggests developing ICT infrastructure is central to regional efforts seeking 
to generate security and sustainable economic growth in state-building projects: “a cell 
phone is a great leap over no phone or a land line.  A computer is much more powerful 
than a calculator or paper notebooks.  And the Internet ... that is a resource we are only 
beginning to leverage."167  
This approach to ICT and state building must be taken with a dose of reality, as 
the benefits afforded by technology must be accompanied by health and education in 
order to maximize the potential for development.168  ICT, then, is not the sole answer to 
effective state building, as nothing can replace the involvement of committed human 
capital.  Nevertheless ICT allows the state-building project and regional efforts to move 
on those ideals of government which are necessary in order to lay the foundations of trust 
for the ‘double compact’ discussed earlier.  For example, the Aga Khan Foundation 
experience in Afghanistan as related by Ghani and Lockhart reinforce the notion of 
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success derived from the combination of “financial, human, and intellectual capital 
enabling a country to connect with global economic, financial, and knowledge flows.”169  
The impact of ICT upon state building also has the capacity to lead to disillusionment.  
For all the advantages ICT brings, it can become a victim of its own expectations as 
technology runs up against the divergent agendas of multiple stakeholders and a lack of 
understanding of the capabilities of ICT by the decision makers.  This phenomenon was 
reflected in the presidential election process in Afghanistan in 2004 when authorities 
decided against an electronic system in favor of an archaic method using cardboard, due 
to the widespread lack of even a basic understanding of “current trends of information 
technology.”170  In retrospect, the advances in technology are still bound by human 
masters and work best when bounded by ‘efficiency, transparency, and accountability’. 
1. Efficiency 
ICT creates efficiency in the state-building project, set in a regional framework, 
with the inherent capability to, at a minimum, “overcome one of the greatest constraints 
in human history—the ability to process large amounts of information and identify 
patterns.”171  Efficiency, then, is defined in relation to how well ICT is managed and 
utilized.  It goes without saying, ICT creates efficiency in just about every sector that 
takes advantage of ICT, but in state building, efficiency may be the deciding factor 
between a successful state-building project, and a “descent into chaos.”172  ICT has the 
capability to reduce the time required to establish or reconstitute state institutions, 
paramount in an era where resources committed to foreign projects may become less 
available due to the political will of those involved.  Furthermore, ICT has the ability to 
enhance productivity in a positive manner as efficiencies increase and local producers are 
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linked to regional and global markets.173  One of the first institutions in just about every 
state-building project is the state educational capacity.  Contemporary society places 
tremendous weight on an education.  However, it does no good if the only job awaiting 
one at the end of a university-level education is a career as an interpreter for an 
occupying army.  Real capacity must be developed, and it must be in the hands of the 
local population.  Education is paramount.  Furthermore, it correlates with state needs; 
the more the state promotes ICT, the more integral it becomes to the state-building 
project. 
2. Transparency 
ICT is inherently transparent.  Technology is used to capture data and information 
and provides access leading to previously unheralded potential for multiple uses.  This is 
both an enabler for free societies and a challenge for authoritarian regimes seeking to 
maintain a monopoly on the information generated within their societies.  ICT, although 
human engineered, is emotionally unattached.  It does not shape data to meet political 
ends and does not manipulate it to support a particular policy.  The use of ICT allows for 
an ‘opening of the books’.  This is vital to the state building process due to the 
information required by the stakeholders.  Project oversight is made much more 
manageable through transparency, while ICT simultaneously allows for monitoring from 
a distance to further reduce the physical signature of the external stakeholders.  Most 
critical to the state-building project, though, is the natural ability of transparency to 
reduce the occurrence of corruption or waste.  Inflated contracts, siphoning off funds, or 
just plain poor management of resources are attributes of any state-building project, but 
these problems can be reduced to manageable levels through a strong infusion of ICT, 
which, when coupled with a policy of transparency, leads to much greater accountability. 
3. Accountability 
In Fixing Failed States, Ghani and Lockhart introduce six components of a 
“National Accountability System,” each of which relies heavily on the incorporation of 
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information technology to produce measures of success.174  This is based on the 
efficiency and transparency characteristics of ICT mentioned previously, and can, in 
theory, provide for accountability by all those involved.  Of course this accountability 
may be mitigated by the state (or more precisely political intervention of various sorts), 
but in a sector such as the economy, government cannot hide a lack of investment, fiscal 
mismanagement, and corruption for any significant amount of time, especially during 
state building when there are numerous interests involved and each relies on 
accountability being built into the project from the local to the regional.  Likewise, 
governments are also held more accountable as their societies become infused with ICT 
capability and access.  Authoritarian governments are bound by what Christopher Kedzie 
describes as the “Dictator’s Dilemma.”  By this, he means that those rulers that try to 
prevent or control ICT in a heavy-handed fashion “to protect their monopoly on power do 
so at the peril of economic growth within and outside their borders.”175  On the flip side 
of this, Matthew Baum emphasizes the way ICT contributes to democratic shifts in 
governance as a result of the accessibility to information by constituents.  He argues that 
ICT actually leads governance towards democracy and peace due the level of scrutiny 
foreign policy endeavors go through in the modern era.176  This measure of 
accountability is important as the political stability of a state-building project 
encompasses not only the project, but its stakeholders from the local to the regional level.  
4. ICT Challenges for Development with Security 
The current capacity of ICT allows many recipients of the state-building project to 
generate ICT infrastructure at a level that would have been unimaginable just a decade 
ago.  With the incorporation of ICT, the state is under increasing pressure to knock down 
                                                 
174 Ashraf Ghani and Clare Lockhart, Fixing Failed States, 196-97. 
175 Christopher R. Kedzie, with Janni Aragon, “Coincident Revolutions and the Dictator’s Dilemma,” 
in Juliann Emmons Allison, ed., Technology, Development, and Democracy: International Conflict and 
Cooperation in the Information Age (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2002), 123. 
176 Matthew A. Baum, “The Communications Revolution and the Political Use of Force,” in Juliann 
Emmons Allison, ed., Technology, Development, and Democracy: International Conflict and Cooperation 
in the Information Age (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2002), 131-59. 
 64
walls from the local to the regional and beyond.177  State-building projects, such as 
Afghanistan, are contemporary examples that are benefiting from the recent strides in 
ICT technology.  University-level education in computer technology, which was 
unattainable a few years ago, is now up and running in the country — producing 
graduates with not only a theoretical, but a practical education as well.178  This is one 
example of the ability of ICT to take root, produce revenue, and move forward.179 
With this in mind, it has become accepted practice for attention to be placed on 
both the judicial and security apparatuses as paramount to an emerging state or state-
building project.  So much so, that the perception of having succeeded or failed at state 
building generally hinges on the ability to generate capacity and capability for the 
judiciary, the police and the military.  ICT applies a whole new dimension to the security 
framework which must be incorporated into any state-building project.  At the same time, 
the critical infrastructure of the state is grounded in the operation of computers and 
computer networks resulting in an interconnectedness, which is susceptible to disruption 
and therefore presents a whole new array of security concerns for the state.180 
G. CONCLUSION 
Any serious analysis of contemporary state building suggests the need to recast 
state building within a regional framework at the same time as every effort is made to 
take into account the local particularities of security and development.  Many of the 
current failures, and future challenges associated with state building, need to be 
understood in relation to the regional context.  Many of the problems that have arisen are 
due to the ‘national’ focus of contemporary state building, while often relying on non-
regional entities to provide security, capacity building, and political construction.  The 
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creation, or amplification of regional frameworks, with a strong dose of imagination and 
diplomacy with regard to what groups or individuals are regarded as stakeholders, offers 
the most realistic solution for successful state building in the future.  
Regional cooperation can generate a large pool of capacity, broader consensus for 
political action, and ideally a more focused policy for consolidating and strengthening 
emerging states.  The monetary system must be compatible with regional and global 
partners and the telecommunications framework must adhere to relevant frequencies and 
bandwidth.  Meanwhile, diplomats and stakeholders must have somewhere to go to 
practice diplomacy and discuss priorities and set policy.  ICT contributes to all these 
needs.  The Hourglass approach for the provision of emerging state assistance within a 
regional framework offers a viable method for thinking about and planning state building 












THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 67
VII. CONCLUSION 
This thesis set out to explore the role of ICT in promoting development and 
political stability framed by the growing significance of globalization and decreasing 
relevance of the nation-state.  Chapter II defines contemporary globalization as the U.S.-
led effort to form transnational institutions and processes.  More specifically, the U.S.-led 
effort contributes to the deceasing relevance of the nation-state in the ever-increasing 
sphere of globalization.  As a result, globalization has modified the essential role of the 
nation-state towards managing global flows of resource, capital, and populations rather 
than, as in the past, presiding over distinct national policies.   
With contemporary globalization as the backdrop, the relationship between ICT 
and political stability was explored in order to determine the existence of a positive, 
negative, or irrelevant correlation.  The relationship between ICT and political stability 
appeared positive in the Asia Pacific Region for 2007.  This positive relationship appears 
as the projection of Internet penetration figures against corresponding metrics 
representing state stability for the Asia Pacific Region.   
Chapter III outlines the contemporary processes of state building in the post-1945 
era.  This thesis relies heavily on Ghani and Lockhart’s design for the state, consisting of 
the double compact.  This double compact consists of (1) a compact between the state 
and constituency and (2) between the state and the international community.  ICT 
demonstrates an ability to enhance the legitimacy for the polity of the state when properly 
levied by promotional policy.  This precept can be seen at work in other contemporary 
state-building projects such as Afghanistan under the direction of UNDP, which 
stipulates a weighted focus on ICT to foster sentiment critical for promoting agendas 
such as the Strengthening State Building through Strategic Government Communication 
Project.  The SSBSGC seeks to “strengthen the drivers of development effectiveness,” 
with an emphasis on “communication channels which promote government 
accountability and transparency,” through increasing key characteristics of ICT such as 
 68
effective information flow and access.181  This inclusion of ICT in state building, “offers 
an unprecedented chance for developing countries to ‘leapfrog’ earlier stages of 
development” and allows the state to connect to a globalized economy.182  The role of 
ICT in state building is more than just an enabler, but, managed properly, will drastically 
reduce the time required to build those lasting institutions necessary for the successful 
development of the state processes.   
The importance of distinct ICT policy design as a contributing factor for both 
political stability and development is portrayed through case study in both Chapters IV 
and V.  Myanmar and Malaysia were selected due to their shared attributes of:  
geographical residence in the Asia Pacific Region, one-party rule, and widely opposing 
views on the design of ICT policy to further political stability and development.  
Myanmar pursues an exclusive ICT policy design, which furthers the restrictive policies 
of an authoritarian regime bent on maintaining a monopoly of access to information.  
Malaysia, on the other hand, has pursued ICT as a pillar of inclusive policy design meant 
to facilitate an envisioned knowledge-based society reliant on education, innovation, and 
export-focused technology transfer.  Both Myanmar and Malaysia have had to deal with 
repercussions unique to each policy.  Myanmar faces difficulties for development 
because of the poor perception by the global community, which was generated by 
preventing ICT access or manipulating the information access allowed.  The situation in 
Myanmar is compounded by the difficulties presented by emerging technologies in 
maintaining a monopoly upon ICT access.  Malaysia, on the other hand, is challenged as 
a result of some of its own success.  Wealth diffusion among the populace is one 
challenge that must be remedied in order to maintain popular support for their national 
ICT infrastructure pursuits.  Malaysia is also challenged by the active mediums for 
dissent offered by their inclusive ICT access policies.  Reactionary measures that seek to  
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stifle dissent may carry damaging repercussions upon their promoted ideals of non-
censorship.  Myanmar and Malaysia then, demonstrate the importance of policy design in 
the debate of ICT and political stability. 
Chapter VI builds upon the significance of globalization, the relationship between 
ICT and political stability, and the contemporary state-building practices in offering a 
regional framework solution to emerging state assistance.  The Hourglass Model suggests 
a regional approach facilitates the double compact of the state by balancing global 
processes with local policy design.  This is a top-down approach with a genuine 
incorporation of local conditions for state building.  A regional approach to emerging 
state assistance exists to meet state-building challenges with a more focused policy 
conduit “first and foremost about facilitating local processes, about leveraging local 
capacities, and about complementing local actions.”183   This particular approach to state 
building is reliant on the region for pooled capacity and cooperative consensus to 
formulate focused policy.  This approach enables the processes of capacity development 
and consensus building intra-state while further reinforcing the shift of sovereignty 
upwards from the state to regional accommodations.  The regional framework for 
emerging state assistance then, reinforces transnational process, makes substantive use of 
existing ICT, and builds upon ideals of locality to further security and development.  The 
ICT attributes of efficiency, transparency, and accountability serve to legitimize the 
viability of such as approach.   
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